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This paper re-visits the topic of a common currency for the Pacific region, 
comprising 14 Pacific island countries (PICs) and the region’s two advanced 
countries, Australia and New Zealand. The PICs are highly dependent upon 
Australia and New Zealand for trade in goods and services and aid inflows. 
Earlier studies on regional common currency, which dealt with certain aspects 
of the optimum currency area conditions, took into consideration three kinds 
of shocks, namely shocks in world output, domestic output and price levels.   
Since PICs’ growth is influenced by regional developments to a larger degree 
than by world developments, this paper takes into consideration regional 
shocks, in addition to shocks in global and national outputs. Using variance 
decomposition analysis in this paper we investigate whether PICs and the 
region’s two advanced countries could be suitable candidates for a currency 
union.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Regional integration of Pacific island countries (PICs) has been the objective 
ever since their leaders joined hands with the two advanced countries in the 
region, Australia and New Zealand to establish in 1971 a regional organization 
called as South Pacific Islands Forum, until a name change in October 2000 to 
Pacific Islands Forum, knows as the Forum (Jayaraman 2007a). The Forum1 
comprises 16 members: Australia and New Zealand, and 14 independent PICs, 
which are: Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Recent steps towards promoting deeper 
integration derived inspiration from the birth of the new currency, the euro in 
1999, heralding the arrival of the new Millennium. These initiatives include 
the signing of two agreements in 2002, one known as the Pacific Island 
Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA), aimed at ushering in free trade amongst 
all PICs by 2010, and the other as Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic 
Cooperation (PACER) for promoting by 2015 intensive economic cooperation 
between PICs and Australia and New Zealand (Jayaraman 2007b).    
 
The idea of a common, regional currency was floated during the annual Forum 
Leaders’ meeting held in Auckland in August 2003, which was attended by 
the heads of member governments. As the subject did not officially figure in 
the agenda of the meeting, it was not formally discussed. However, it was 
apparent that Australia was keen to adopt a common currency, as a step 
towards bringing about greater fiscal and monetary discipline. The timing of 
the proposal for a common currency was triggered by certain global and 
regional developments. They included the perceived terror threat to the region 
and failure of some PICs in maintaining peace and order. Furthermore, the 
deteriorating economic conditions in some of island states due to weak 
economic policies and poor governance were causing concerns to donors in 
regard to aid effectiveness (Hughes 2003), which prompted an Australian 
Senate Committee (2003) to come up with a strong plea for a Pacific 
Economic and Political Community.  One of the recommendations made by 
the Australian Senate Committee for promoting regional stability was 
adopting a common currency, preferably the Australian dollar, replacing the 
existing national currencies.  
 
The subject of a regional currency was the focus of attention in several studies. 
These include de Brouwer (2000), Chand (2003), Bowman (2002), Jayaraman 
(2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2007c) and Jayaraman and Ward 
(2006). It was concluded that due to the existence of substantial trade between 
Australia and PICs, the gains from adopting the Australian dollar, as common 
currency, which would arise from reduced transaction costs involved in 
currency conversion and from absence of volatility in exchange rates, would 
                                                          
1 Australia, as the largest and richest member of the Forum, bears a major proportion of its administrative costs. 
Further, it plays a lead role as a significant provider of foreign aid to PICs.   
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be large and beneficial. However, it was argued that since external shocks in 
the past affecting the PICs, Australia and New Zealand were asymmetric in 
nature, a single set of common monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies 
would not serve individual country’s interests and hence it was concluded that 
the time was not yet ripe for the formation of a currency union. The only study 
(Ward and Jayaraman 2006), which specifically examined the nature and 
impact of shocks on PICs and Australia and New Zealand, took into 
consideration three kinds of shocks, relating to world output, domestic output 
and price levels.   
 
In the context of PICs’ dependency for bilateral trade, aid and direct 
investment inflows on the two metropolitan countries in the region, it is 
considered appropriate to consider the impact of regional shocks as well. 
Accordingly, this paper re-visits the subject by taking into account shocks in 
regional output, represented by Australian output, besides the global and 
country specific output shocks.  
 
The paper is organized on the following lines: the second section undertakes a 
very brief review of the literature on the subject; the third section outlines the 
methodology while the fourth section reports and interprets the results. The 
final and fifth section presents some conclusions with policy implications. 
 
    
2. Review of Empirical Literature Review on Single Currency for the 
Pacific Region 
 
In the event of the Australian dollar being adopted as the common currency of 
the region, the cost for Australia would be minimal since its central bank, the 
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) would continue with unfettered freedom to 
pursue its own monetary policy.  Substantial benefits to Australia would 
consequently arise from increase in its volume of trade, since dollarisation of 
the region would lead to elimination of transaction costs and volatility in 
exchange rates between Australia and others in the region.  
 
As Alesena and Barro (2001) noted, just as a common language promotes 
communication among people, a common currency could promote trade and 
investment among countries in the region.  These benefits will have to be 
weighed against the likely costs that have to be incurred by other Forum 
members. The costs would include the costs of discontinuing their own 
independent currencies by replacing with the Australian dollar and the loss of 
seigniorage revenue from printing their own currencies.  Further, all of them 
have to fall in line with Australian macroeconomic and exchange rate policies.  
 
A common currency entails a single set of economic, monetary, financial and 
fiscal policies to influence the balance of payments of the region.  Such a 
single set of policies can be justified only when there is a high degree of 
synchronization of business cycles for all prospective member countries of a 
currency union.  According to Mundell’s seminal contribution (1961), known 
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as optimum currency area (OCA) conditions, countries experiencing common 
external shocks would be better suited to form a currency union because it 
permits the use of union-wide policies to correct any imbalances, including the 
adjustment of the common currency.  The OCA conditions have since been 
elaborated, refined and updated by growing literature on the subject (Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen 1993, 1994; Bayoumi, Eichengreen and Mauro 2000; 
Bayoumi and Ostry 1997; Bayoumi and Mauro 1999;  Eichengreen and 
Bayoumi, 1999; International Monetary Fund  2001, 1997) 
In regard to adoption the Australian dollar as common currency, a former 
Governor of New Zealand’s central bank (Brash 2000), has gone on record in 
2000 that the time for adopting the Australian dollar by New Zealand as a 
common currency was not ripe.  Arguing along the lines of OCA conditions, 
he observed that there had been a lack of synchronization of business cycles 
between Australia and New Zealand during the recent past.  In addition to the 
availability of a central banker’s point of view, there have been some 
academic studies as well on the feasibility of a currency union between the 
two countries.  These include Crosby and Otto (2003), Coleman (1999), 
Hargraves and McDermott (1999), Grimes, Holmes, and Bowden (1998).  The 
findings were, however, not unanimous.  While Grimes et al. (1998) felt that a 
common currency for Australia and New Zealand would be beneficial, Crosby 
and Otto (2003) opined otherwise.  Arguing from the Australian point of view, 
Crosby and Otto (2003) concluded that (i) Australia and New Zealand were 
not suitable candidates for the currency union; (ii) the benefits of a currency 
union for Australia would be small; and (iii) it would be worthwhile to 
consider currency union with the United States rather than with New Zealand.  
 
In regard to PICs, whose key indicators are given in Table 1,  various studies 
on the feasibility of a single currency de Brouwer (2000), Chand (2003), 
Bowman (2002), Jayaraman (2001, 2003, 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2007) and 
Jayaraman and Ward (2006) came to a general agreement that due to the 
existence of substantial trade between Australia and PICs, the gains from a 
single currency arising out of reduced transaction costs in currency conversion 
and from the absence of any volatility in exchange rates would be large and 
hence beneficial. However, it was argued by Ward and Jayaraman (2006) that 
since external shocks in the past affecting the PICs and the two developed 
countries in the region were asymmetrical in nature, one common set of 
monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies for all Forum countries would not 
serve individual country’s interest and hence it was concluded PICs are not 
suitable candidates for a currency union either with Australia or New Zealand. 
The two authors’ study took into consideration three kinds of shocks in world 
output, domestic output and price levels.  Since PICs have close association 
with the region’s two advanced economies of Australia and New Zealand 
through trade (Table 2), regional shocks would be of considerable significance 













































Islands 19 0.2 2,651 62 NA 490.0 NA 28.0 
Fiji 841 18.3 2,720 92 8 76.0 3.9 2.6 
Fed States 
of 
Micronesia 110 0.7 2,300 120 NA 787.0 NA 36.0 
Kiribati 98 0.7 970 129 59 171.0 22,5 17.8 
Palau 20 0.5 6,870 NA NA 978.0 NA 15.0 
Papua New 
Guinea 5,722 462 560 137 30 46.0 7.2 7.6 
Republic of 
Marshall 
Island 61 0.2 2,320 121 NA 836.0 49.6 37.4 
Samoa 184 2.8 1,840 74 20 167.0 42.6 8.2 
Solomon 
Islands 468 28.9 560 128 11 262.0 21.7 47.8 
Tonga 102 0.7 1,360 54 3 109.0 26.3 9.1 
Tuvalu 11 0.003 345 118 NA 260.0 47.2 45.0 
Vanuatu 207 12.2 1,390 118 1 162.0 33.0 12.4 

































































- 10.26 9.52 4.9 21.07 7.19 25.51 70.94 51.43 
1998 - 11.76 10.83 5.6 28.3 9.75 10.4 68.2 52.45 
1999 - 10.44 9.82 5.2 9.32 8.2 25.2 68.94 54.85 
2000 - 18.49 15.68 12.03 33.91 5.97 25.13 60.58 76.73 









0.31 0.07 0.38 0.505 26.67 39.86 6.99 15.50 76.87 
1998 4.73 0.12 2.13 0.73 33.79 44.84 4.31 15.11 86.84 
1999 6.84 0.1 2.81 0.64 33.02 41.09 4.47 13.10 90.62 
2000 7.11 0.14 3.35 0.94 25.67 48.71 3.53 13.04 89.62 












- 7.8 5.15 11.67 3.02 18.11 - 3.94 88.78 
1998 - 10.01 8.7 17.06 4.05 21.82 - 1.69 102.74 
1999 - 14 11.37 16.31 2.59 33.08 - 3.02 98.02 
2000 - 14.21 10.7 22.26 0.24 34.12 - 4.75 80.98 











- 0.97 0.71 0.46 - 1.31 - 1.01 83.41 
1998 - 0.78 0.7 0.35 - 2.01 - 0.71 67.93 
1999 - 1.16 1.02 0.5 - 1.42 - 0.85 68.94 
2000 - 1.25 1.05 0.54 - 1.46 - 0.89 68.33 











0.01 - 0.01 0.01 NA 2.62 - - 65.61 
1998 0.19 - 0.02 0.01 NA 4.02 - - 64.71 
1999 0.2 - 0.02 0.01 NA 19.79 - - 64.39 
2000 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA - 73.07 











0.03 0.03 0.06 0.11 27.68 51.43 1.39 4.01 88.89 
1998 0.21 0.24 0.45 0.21 18.72 52.41 0.69 4.12 94.70 
1999 0.18 0.30 0.44 0.23 26.29 53.01 0.16 4.1 114.12 
2000 0.21 0.36 0.57 0.29 29.98 49.54 0.73 3.8 116.45 











- 10.49 7.70 6.50 84.18 19.18 6.17 35.15 47.89 
1998 - 18.08 11.9 11.6 48.96 16.23 2.74 22.59 51.74 
1999 - 16.67 12.27 11.52 58.95 14.59 3.68 23.01 57.34 
2000 - 9.48 13.02 9.48 57.36 27.31 2.37 13.89 38.69 











0.38 0.66 1.04 1.92 1.38 40.92 0.26 7.43 94.27 
1998 1.07 4.3 5.1 2.66 1.97 42.96 0.35 5.26 108.46 
1999 1.29 3.7 4.36 2.81 1.34 38.53 0.47 6.29 110.78 
2000 2.1 6.1 8.2 3.7 2.79 27.5 0.74 5.63 85.89 












3.08 7.65 6.97 3.76 4.72 33.56 9.66 38.47 51.67 
1998 6.12 7.41 7.26 4.04 4.53 24.68 13.98 36.17 52.4 
1999 2.0 9.96 8.79 4.98 3.21 19.98 8.74 37.22 65.7 
2000 1.65 12.2 9.73 6.65 1.98 10.27 3.68 23.99 79.2 











1.04 30.49 45.5 29.23 - 39.41 - 6.31 81.63 
1998 1.61 59.81 58.39 41.24 - 20.21 - 6.31 70.06 






 2000 11.39 58.58 56.01 58.77 - 19.57 - 4.57 104.93 
 7
2001 13.92 65.19 62.48 69.7 - 16.28 - 7.68 52.10 




0.01 0.93 0.94 2.67 4.05 21 0.47 5.19 85.58 
1998 1.41 5.67 7.08 3.92 0.60 21.67 0.39 4.76 92.32 
1999 1.19 4.12 5.31 3.98 0.68 17.95 0.44 4.13 122.87 
2000 4.84 8.55 13.39 5.75 0.54 25.08 0.44 6.93 79.24 







2002 - 7.11 1.88 4.13 3.20 23.48 0.64 10.69 52.41 
NA: Not available 
“ - ”: Negligible                                         
Source: Asian Development Bank (2003) 
 
 
3. Methodology and Data   
 
Following Chow and Kim (2003), we estimate the output growth function 
subject to three different types of shocks, namely global, regional and country-








t uLuLuLy )()()( 3210 ββββ +++=∆       (1) 
 
where ...)( 2210 +++= LLL iiii ββββ  is a polynomial function of the lag 
operator, L. Generally, global shock influence economies both inside and 
outside the regional boundary. The oil price shock in the 1970s is an example 
of global shock. Regional shocks are generally common to economies within a 
region. On the other hand, country-specific shocks are unique to a particular 
economy, which may result from either aggregate demand shock (monetary or 
fiscal policy changes) or supply shocks on productivity or terms of trade 
(Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1993).  
 
The distinctions between these three shocks have significant, powerful policy 
implications. For example, if country-specific shocks are dominant and less 
correlated across the region, a member country of a currency union may be a 
loser, in the absence of monetary independence and freedom to resort to 
exchange rate adjustments. On the other side, if  regional shocks affect all 
prospective member countries in the same manner, there is sufficient 
justification for  a single set of common monetary and exchange rate policies 
within the region. In contrast, if global shocks are dominant and if they 
similarly affect all economies inside the region, a more global arrangement 
might be necessary. Nevertheless, as long as shocks influence all economies in 
the similar pattern, a global rather than regional policy arrangement may be 
more appropriate course of action in dealing with such shocks.  
 
In the Pacific region, for instance, if shocks in global output (U.S. output) 
impact PICs more than regional shocks (say Australian output shock), the 
formation of American dollar bloc may be a better policy choice than a 
formation of an Australian dollar bloc. Based on these explanations, it is 
indicated that a model of regional integration needs to consider a minimum of 
three types of shocks.  
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Considering a three-variable model with global, regional and local 






























































    (2) 
where ...)( 2210 +++= LLLA ijijijij ααα . In the matrix form, tt uLAy )(=∆ . 
 
Following Chow and Kim (2003), it is assumed that the structural shocks are 
uncorrelated and of unit variance: .)( IuVar t =  Since structural shocks are 
unobserved, few identifying restrictions need to be employed to recover them 
from reduced-form innovations. First, both regional and country-specific 
shocks have no long run relationship with global output. Second, country-
specific shocks are uncorrelated with regional output in the long run. 
Generally, these restrictions are usually imposed on the small economy 
because an economy is viewed to be small in a region and the region is a small 
part of the global economy. Structural vector autoregression (VAR) technique, 
as proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) and King, et al. (1991) will be 
applied to estimate the above empirical model. The technique depends on the 





In this study, output is represented by real GDP. Aside from Australia and 
New Zealand,  six major PICs are studied. The choice of PICs is dictated by 
the availability of national accounts data series on a consistent basis. The PICs 
chosen are: Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and 
Vanuatu.  While the Australian output is used as a proxy for regional output, 
the US output represents the global output.  All output data are in index form 
and the data sources are International Financial Statistics, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for real GDP data relating to Australia, New Zealand 
and the US; and UNESCAP (2007) and Asian Development Bank (2007) for 






                                                          
2 Although such long-run restrictions tend to be less controversial and more readily accepted 
than other assumptions, they are not without criticisms. There are, at least two criticisms have 
been made. First, Faust and Leeper (1997) argue that structural inferences under the long-run 
scheme may not be reliable as the long-run effects of shocks are imprecisely estimated in 
finite samples and the long-run identification scheme transfers this imprecision to the 
estimates of other parameters of the model. Second criticism is that the estimated disturbances 
are intertwined with the underlying disturbances. 
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Table 3: USA, Aus, NZ and PICS: Real GDP Index numbers Pacific Islands, 
Real GDP 
 
 1981 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
USA  100.0 114.3 134.0 151.4 185.3 186.8 190.3 196.2 204.4 211.6 218.6
Aus 100.0 112.3 130.5 153.1 185.4 192.6 198.7 206.3 212.5 217.8 223.7
NZ 100.0 113.3 116.7 135.8 154.3 159.7 167.0 173.1 180.7 184.7 187.4
Fiji 100.0 93.3 104.5 119.3 131.1 134.6 140.4 141.8 149.3 150.4 155.8
PNG  100.0 107.3 113.7 171.3 190.8 194.2 192.3 196.5 201.8 208.5 216.2
Samoa 100.0 104.6 108.4 114.4 137.4 147.0 148.5 153.7 159.3 167.5 173.3
Sol. Is. 100.0 119.6 167.2 217.6 190.0 173.5 169.8 180.7 195.1 204.9 217.6
Tonga 100.0 115.8 117.5 142.8 154.3 158.3 163.1 168.3 170.6 174.6 177.9
vanuatu 100.0 126.9 124.0 170.9 197.3 192.0 182.6 187.8 198.2 211.7 226.5
Source: IMF (2007), ADB (2007), UNESCAP (2007) 
 
4. Empirical Results   
 
As a first step, we tested the time series properties of each data series of 
RGDP of US. Australia, New Zealand and six PICs. All the variables in levels 
contain unit root. However, test statistics reject the null of unit root at 5 % 
level of significance. Thus, the series are of I(1). 
 
In the presence of a non-stationary series, a cointegration test was performed 
using the Johansen (1988) procedure. The test statistics indicated the presence 
of a long-run relationship in all PICs (Table 5.A and Table 5.B).  
 
Table 4: Results of Unit Root Tests (Sample Period: 1981-2006) 
 

















US -2.4020 (0) -5.2199* (0) -9.7780 (1) -24.6035* (5) 
Australia -2.4881 (0) -5.6786* (1) -7.3209 (1) -8.2985* (2) 
New Zealand -1.8646 (1) -3.0367* (0) -7.9403 (1) -9.5529* (0) 
Fiji  -2.2084 (2) -7.5984* (0) -7.4984 (0) -7.9340* (0) 
PNG -2.2482 (1) -3.7626* (0) -12.2431 (1) -11.5502* (0) 
Samoa -0.8479 (1) -4.0592* (0) -1.8885 (0) -11.0951* (0) 
Solomon -1.9828 (1) -3.3632* (0) -5.0708 (1) -11.1103* (0) 
Tonga -3.2707 (2) -5.0089* (0) -8.3452 (2) -11.4452* (0) 
Vanuatu -2.1759 (0) -4.3787* (0) -6.5988 (0) -10.6902* (0) 
Note: The ADF critical value at 5% level is –2.9640 and –3.5629 for constant without trend 
and constant with trend regressions, respectively.  These critical values are based on 
Mckinnon.  The optimal lag is selected on the basis of Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
The Ng and Perron critical value is based on Ng and Perron (2001) critical value and the 
optimal lag is selected based on Spectral GLS-detrended AR based on SIC. The null 
hypothesis of the test is: a series has a unit root. The asterisk * denotes the rejection of the null 




Table 5.A: Results of Johansen and Juselius Multivariate Procedure 
(Australia as Regional Shock) 
 
Maximum Eigenvalue Trace Hypothesis 
Test Statistic 95% Test Statistic 95% 
Fiji  
P=0 25.21** 21.13 34.93** 29.80 
P≤1 9.55 14.26 9.72 15.49 
P≤2 0.17 3.84 0.17 3.84 
PNG 
P=0 35.33** 21.13 47.75** 29.80 
P≤1 11.32 14.26 12.42 15.49 
P≤2 1.11 3.84 1.11 3.84 
Samoa 
P=0 22.07** 21.13 30.93** 29.80 
P≤1 7.61 14.26 8.85 15.49 
P≤2 1.25 3.84 1.25 3.84 
Solomon 
P=0 22.66** 21.13 28.94* 29.80 
P≤1 5.07 14.26 6.28 15.49 
P≤2 1.21 3.84 1.21 3.84 
Tonga 
P=0 20.96* 21.13 31.61** 29.80 
P≤1 10.43 14.26 10.65 15.49 
P≤2 0.22 3.84 0.22 3.84 
Vanuatu 
P=0 27.04** 21.13 35.31** 29.80 
P≤1 8.27 14.26 8.27 15.49 
P≤2 0.00 3.84 0.00 3.84 
Notes:   * and ** indicates significant at 10 and 5 per cent levels, respectively.  
























Table 5.B: Results of Johansen and Juselius Multivariate Procedure (New 
Zealand as Regional Shock) 
 
Maximum Eigenvalue Trace Hypothesis 
Test Statistic 95% Test Statistic 95% 
Fiji  
P=0 40.90** 21.13 52.38** 29.80 
P≤1 11.27 14.26 11.48 15.49 
P≤2 0.21 3.84 0.21 3.84 
PNG 
P=0 24.95** 21.13 31.98** 29.80 
P≤1 7.02 14.26 7.03 15.49 
P≤2 0.01 3.84 0.01 3.84 
Samoa 
P=0 26.39** 21.13 37.28** 29.80 
P≤1 10.10 14.26 10.89 15.49 
P≤2 0.79 3.84 0.79 3.84 
Solomon 
P=0 23.94** 21.13 27.23* 29.80 
P≤1 3.28 14.26 3.29 15.49 
P≤2 0.01 3.84 0.01 3.84 
Tonga 
P=0 29.75** 21.13 42.17** 29.80 
P≤1 12.42 14.26 12.42 15.49 
P≤2 0.01 3.84 0.01 3.84 
Vanuatu 
P=0 21.84** 21.13 29.60* 29.80 
P≤1 7.30 14.26 7.77 15.49 
P≤2 0.47 3.84 0.47 3.84 
Notes:   * and ** indicates significant at 10 and 5 per cent levels, respectively.  





Hence, all variables were entered in the VAR in levels, thereby resorting to the 
methodology of orthogonalized forecast error variance decomposition, which 
is based on Choleski factorization with particular ordering, namely: global 
output, regional output, and domestic output.  Results of variance 
decomposition global, regional and country-specific shocks for a nine-year-










Table 6: Variance Decomposition of Real Output in PICs: 1981– 2006 
(Australian Output as Regional Output)   
 
 Period S.E. 
Global  






1 0.031 3.979 1.596 94.425 
3 0.039 10.257 25.815 63.928 
5 0.044 18.080 31.208 50.712 
7 0.048 25.273 31.900 42.827 
9 0.052 31.217 31.366 37.417 
Papua New Guinea 
1 0.054 11.622 0.612 87.767 
3 0.094 7.291 24.144 68.565 
5 0.116 6.229 42.289 51.482 
7 0.118 8.449 41.306 50.245 
9 0.119 9.586 40.656 49.758 
Samoa 
1 0.034 3.844 51.294 44.862 
3 0.050 3.370 59.416 37.214 
5 0.065 3.655 64.459 31.886 
7 0.072 3.685 68.035 28.281 
9 0.073 3.645 68.478 27.877 
Solomon Islands 
1 0.052 2.681 64.358 32.961 
3 0.095 1.286 79.236 19.478 
5 0.104 10.479 72.300 17.221 
7 0.138 15.160 74.095 10.745 
9 0.147 16.424 73.893 9.683 
Tonga 
1 0.024 0.676 16.541 82.784 
3 0.035 4.017 14.834 81.149 
5 0.040 5.113 31.207 63.680 
7 0.043 4.881 36.370 58.749 
9 0.046 5.420 38.554 56.026 
Vanuatu 
1 0.029 45.969 4.538 49.494 
3 0.067 17.268 54.590 28.143 
5 0.078 12.978 59.038 27.985 
7 0.079 13.284 59.374 27.342 
9 0.081 14.383 59.457 26.160 
Cholesky Ordering: Global output, Regional output, Country-specific output 
 
 
The results indicate the strong influence of country-specific shock in regard to 
Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga. In the one-year-ahead period, about 
94.4% of variability in Fiji’s output is accounted for by variability in its own 
national output, followed by Papua New Guinea (87.8%) and Tonga (83.8%).  
This is contrasted with the results in the case of Samoa, Solomon Islands and 
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Vanuatu, where country-specific shocks account for a much lower proportion 
in their output variability ranging from 32.9% to 49.5%.  
 
On the other hand, global output shock explains approximately 11.6% of 
variance of output in PNG in the one-year-ahead and much less in all PICs, 
except Vanuatu. Nevertheless, by 9 years ahead, the explanations of the 
variance by global shock in these economies are quite stable, except for Fiji, 
which exhibits an increasing path. The variation in Fiji’s output is explained 
by global shock for about 31.2% in the 9-year ahead.  
 
The results show that variations in the real GDP of all PICs are increasingly 
explained by regional shocks (proxied by innovations in Australian real GDP) 
from 1-year ahead to 9-year ahead period: Fiji (1.6%-31.5%), Papua New 
Guinea (0.6%-40.7%), Samoa (51.3%-68.5%), Solomon Islands (64.4%-
73.9%), Tonga (16.5%-38.5%) and Vanuatu (4.5%-59.5%).  
 
Using an alternative measure of regional shock, namely shocks in New 
Zealand’s output, variance decomposition of PICs’ real output is shown in 
Table 7. The results indicate that global shock still accounts for a small 
proportion of the yearly output variability at 1-year forecast horizon in Papua 
New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. However, it increases over time 
and accounts for a sizable proportion of variability in national output of Fiji 
(67%), Samoa (40.9%) and Tonga (42.6%).  Further, consistent with the 
results reported in Table 6, the country-specific shock explains substantially a 
larger proportion of output variability in all PICs at the first-year-ahead 
forecast horizon, except for Fiji. These results imply that PICs are not to a 
great extent influenced by global and regional shocks in the short-term. 
However, the influence of country-specific shock is on the decline over the 9-
year forecast horizon.  Further more, the results show that the regional shock 
accounts for a large proportion of national output variability in all PICs at the 
one-year-ahead forecast. The influence of regional shock (when proxied by 
New Zealand’s output variability) on national output is increasing over time, 
more than 20% in all PICs except Papua New Guinea at the 9-year-ahead 
forecast.   
 
Thus, the variance decomposition results reveal that in the short-run, PICs are 
greatly influenced by their own country-specific shocks and less vulnerable to 











Table 7: Variance Decomposition of Real Output in Pacific Island 
Countries (PICs), 1981 – 2006, (New Zealand Output as Regional Output)   
 








1 0.031 48.234 42.231 9.535 
3 0.036 55.250 37.258 7.493 
5 0.038 55.236 37.570 7.194 
7 0.044 64.342 29.348 6.310 
9 0.047 67.570 26.364 6.065 
Papua New Guinea 
1 0.050 3.209 13.437 83.354 
3 0.080 3.303 7.214 89.483 
5 0.088 6.190 10.102 83.708 
7 0.092 8.574 13.581 77.845 
9 0.095 10.005 13.914 76.081 
Samoa 
1 0.030 21.637 15.276 63.087 
3 0.051 27.117 45.084 27.798 
5 0.071 39.942 45.118 14.939 
7 0.080 41.532 45.209 13.259 
9 0.082 40.937 45.906 13.157 
Solomon Islands 
1 0.034 0.676 19.758 79.566 
3 0.088 16.030 23.824 60.146 
5 0.099 16.889 22.776 60.335 
7 0.103 18.048 25.013 56.938 
9 0.115 21.162 31.413 47.425 
Tonga 
1 0.020 7.938 11.457 80.605 
3 0.035 23.278 42.578 34.143 
5 0.043 34.789 40.966 24.245 
7 0.047 39.835 39.182 20.982 
9 0.051 42.564 38.355 19.081 
Vanuatu 
1 0.055 7.571 29.942 62.487 
3 0.079 9.535 25.107 65.358 
5 0.083 9.627 26.328 64.044 
7 0.086 11.431 28.866 59.703 
9 0.089 12.892 30.356 56.751 









Table 8: Variance Decomposition of Real Output in Australia, 1981-2006 
 
Period S.E. 
     (Global 
Output) 
United States 
   (Regional 
Output) 




1 0.010 37.873 0.000 62.127 
3 0.023 30.484 10.347 59.169 
5 0.034 28.687 18.257 53.057 
7 0.042 27.693 21.494 50.814 
9 0.049 27.425 22.920 49.656 
Cholesky Ordering: Global output, Regional output, Country-specific output 
 
 











1 0.014 6.357 6.392 87.251 
3 0.028 4.523 31.108 64.369 
5 0.039 5.814 32.394 61.792 
7 0.048 8.172 33.445 58.383 
9 0.056 10.214 34.646 55.141 
Cholesky Ordering: Global output, Regional output, Country-specific output 
 
Tables 8 and 9 focus exclusive attention on Australia and New Zealand. These 
two countries, unlike PICs have much deeper trade and investment relations, 
near perfect mobility in capital and labour between themselves. However, we 
observe that variability in their national outputs is greatly explained by their 
own specific shock, not only in the short term, but also in the long term. 
Furthermore, it is noted that these two countries experience asymmetric 
shocks in respect to global developments, as global shocks explain a larger 
proportion of the yearly forecast error in Australia than in New Zealand.  
 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions  
 
This paper undertook an empirical investigation whether PICs can form a 
currency union with Australia and New Zealand. Employing the methodology 
of variance decomposition with two different proxy measures for regional 
output, namely Australian and New Zealand output) shock, we find that (i) 
most of the variability in PICs’s domestic outputs in the short- and medium 
terms appears to be largely explained by their own country-specific output 
shocks; (ii) the influence of domestic shock on PICs respective output declines 
over the 9-year period; (iii) the decreasing influence of country-specific shock 
in explaining the variability in domestic outputs in all PICs is accompanied by 
an increasing influence of regional shock in these economies; (iv) the role of 
global shock appears to be of less importance in explaining the variability of 
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domestic output in most PICs; and (v) variability in Australian output has 
much greater influence on PICs than variability in New Zealand’s output on 
PICs’ domestic outputs.   
 
The conclusion that emerges from the foregoing discussion is that since PICs 
are strongly affected by their own country-specific conditions, they are not 
presently suitable candidates for a currency union amongst themselves.  The 
variability in domestic outputs of PICs seems to result from their own 
aggregate demand shocks (monetary or fiscal policy changes) or domestic 
supply shocks, stemming from natural disasters and other unforeseen unstable 
conditions, including political uncertainties. Despite sharing several 
commonalities in terms of openness and other unique cultural characteristics 
such as communal land tenure, PICs are quite different from each other, 
because of the diversity in institutional factors and political trends, resulting in 
asymmetric domestic output shocks.  
 
Since the influence of Australia has been large and evidence of an increasing 
role for the global currency is relatively faint, it is evident that regional output 
shocks would continue to be dominant. In these circumstances, although a 
currency union in the region cannot be justified in the short-term, there does 
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